Sovereign state

This is an article on the subjects of international law. For a general article on the state, see State (polity). For sub-national entities called states, see Federated state. For other uses, see State.

Contents

A sovereign state is a political association with effective internal and external sovereignty over a geographic area, and which is not dependent on, or subject to any other power or state.[1] While in abstract terms a sovereign state can exist without being recognised by other sovereign states, unrecognised states will often find it hard to exercise full treaty-making powers and engage in diplomatic relations with other sovereign states.

The term country is often used colloquially to mean sovereign state, although it is not correct usage and merely refers to a geographic area rather than a political territory.

History

Since the late 19th century, virtually the entirety of the world's inhabitable land has been parceled up into areas with more or less definite borders claimed by various states. Earlier, quite large land areas had been either unclaimed or uninhabited, or inhabited by nomadic peoples who were not organized as states. However, even within present-day states there are vast areas of wilderness, like the Amazon Rainforest, which are uninhabited or inhabited solely or mostly by indigenous people (and some of them remain uncontacted). Also, there are states which do not hold de facto control over all of their claimed territory or where this control is challenged (as in the 2006 civil war in Somalia).

Currently the international community comprises more than 200 sovereign states, the vast majority of which are represented in the United Nations. These states form what international relations theorists call a system, where each state takes into account the behavior of other states when making their own calculations. From this point of view, states embedded in an international system face internal and external security and legitimation dilemmas. Recently the notion of an international community has been developed to refer to a group of states who have established rules, procedures, and institutions for the conduct of their relations. In this way the foundation has been laid for international law, diplomacy, formal regimes, and organizations.

Definition

Sovereignty is a term that is frequently misused.[2] Lassa Oppenheim said "There exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon."[3] In the opinion of Justice Evatt of the High Court of Australia "sovereignty is neither a question of fact, nor a question of law, but a question that does not arise at all." [4]

In casual usage, the terms "country", "nation", and "state" are often used as if they were synonymous; but in a more strict usage they can be distinguished:

Recognition

State recognition signifies the decision of a sovereign state to treat another entity as also being a sovereign state.[5] Recognition can be either express or implied and is usually retroactive in its effects. It doesn't necessarily signify a desire to establish or maintain diplomatic relations.

There is no definition that is binding on all the members of the community of nations on the criteria for statehood. In actual practice, the criteria are mainly political, not legal.[6] L.C. Green cited the recognition of the unborn Polish and Czech states in World War I and explained that "recognition of statehood is a matter of discretion, it is open to any existing state to accept as a state any entity it wishes, regardless of the existence of territory or an established government."[7]

In international law, however, there are several theories of when a state should be recognized as sovereign.[8]

Constitutive theory

The constitutive theory of statehood defines a state as a person of international law if, and only if, it is recognized as sovereign by other states. This theory of recognition, was developed in the 19th century. Under it, a state was sovereign if another sovereign state recognized it as such. Because of this, new states could not immediately become part of the international community or be bound by international law, and recognized nations did not have to respect international law in their dealings with them.[9] In 1815 at the Congress of Vienna the Final Act only recognised 39 sovereign states in the European diplomatic system, and as a result it was firmly established that in future new states would have to be recognised by other states, and that meant in practice recognition by one or more of the great powers.[10]

One of the major criticisms of this law is the confusion caused when some states recognize a new entity, but other states do not. Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the theory's main proponents, suggested that it is a state's duty to grant recognition as a possible solution. However, a state may use any criteria when judging if they should give recognition and they have no obligation to use such criteria. Many states may only recognize another state if it is to their advantage.[9]

In 1912, L. F. L. Oppenheim had the following to say on constitutive theory:

...International Law does not say that a State is not in existence as long as it is not recognised, but it takes no notice of it before its recognition. Through recognition only and exclusively a State becomes an International Person and a subject of International Law.[11]

Most modern authorities reject the constitutive theory of statehood, citing among other reasons that it leads to subjectivity in the notion of the state. Another problem is that recognition, even majority recognition, is not binding on third states in international law.. This situation is illustrative in the cases of the state of Biafra which did not command sufficient international support to establish the constitutive theory of statehood.

A state may be recognized as a state, but not all of the territory it occupies may be considered to be a part of that state, such as the case when Transjordan (now Jordan) occupied what it termed the West Bank (acquired by military conquest), but only recognized by Pakistan and the UK.

Where the factual reality of the situation in the country does not quite match up to the requirements of Statehood listed in the Montevideo Convention recognition becomes important as proof that the claim to Statehood is good in law. While no single act of recognition will conclusively determine the legal status of an entity, acts of recognition may be evidence in support of its claim that it is a State.

Declarative theory

By contrast, the "declarative" theory defines a state as a person in international law if it meets the following criteria: 1) a defined territory; 2) a permanent population; 3) a government and 4) a capacity to enter into relations with other states. According to declarative theory, an entity's statehood is independent of its recognition by other states. The declarative model was most famously expressed in the 1933 Montevideo Convention.

Article 3 of the Convention declares that statehood is independent of recognition by other states. In contrast, recognition is considered a requirement for statehood by the constitutive theory of statehood.

A similar opinion about "the conditions on which an entity constitutes a state" is expressed by the European Economic Community Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee. The Badinter Arbitration Committee found that a state was defined by having a territory, a population, and a political authority.

States that no longer practice recognition

States have slowly abandoned the debate over the constitutive and declarative theories of statehood.[12] The general acceptance of the principles of self-determination; sovereign equality of states; and decolonization have made the criteria less important than they once were. Many states no longer engage in the formal practices of recognition.[13]

De facto and de jure states

Most sovereign states are states de jure and de facto (i.e. they exist both in law and in reality). However, sometimes states exist only as de jure states in that an organisation is recognised as having sovereignty over and being the legitimate government of a territory over which they have no actual control. Many continental European states maintained governments-in-exile during the Second World War which continued to enjoy diplomatic relations with the Allies, notwithstanding that their countries were under Nazi occupation. A present day example is the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, which is a United Nations observer, has bi-lateral diplomatic relations with 104 states, while having no territory and possessing only extraterritorial areas (i.e. embassies and consulates).[14] Other states may have sovereignty over a territory but lack international recognition, these are de facto states only. Somaliland is commonly considered to be such a state.[15][16][17][18] For a list of entities that wish to be universally recognized as sovereign states, but do not have complete worldwide diplomatic recognition, see the list of states with limited recognition.

The sovereign state in modern political thought

The rise of the modern state system was closely related to changes in political thought, especially concerning the changing understanding of legitimate state power. Early modern defenders of absolutism such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin undermined the doctrine of the divine right of kings by arguing that the power of kings should be justified by reference to the people. Hobbes in particular went further and argued that political power should be justified with reference to the individual, not just to the people understood collectively. Both Hobbes and Bodin thought they were defending the power of kings, not advocating democracy, but their arguments about the nature of sovereignty were fiercely resisted by more traditional defenders of the power of kings, like Sir Robert Filmer in England, who thought that such defenses ultimately opened the way to more democratic claims.

These and other early thinkers introduced two important concepts in order to justify sovereign power: the idea of a state of nature and the idea of a social contract. The first concept describes an imagined situation in which the state - understood as a centralized, coercive power - does not exist, and human beings have all their natural rights and powers; the second describes the conditions under which a voluntary agreement could take human beings out of the state of nature and into a state of civil society. Depending on what they understood human nature to be and the natural rights they thought human beings had in that state, various writers were able to justify more or less extensive forms of the state as a remedy for the problems of the state of nature. Thus, for example, Hobbes, who described the state of nature as a "war of every man, against every man,"[19] argued that sovereign power should be almost absolute since almost all sovereign power would be better than such a war, whereas John Locke, who understood the state of nature in more positive terms, thought that state power should be strictly limited.[20] Both of them nevertheless understood the powers of the state to be limited by what rational individuals would agree to in a hypothetical or actual social contract.

The idea of the social contract lent itself to more democratic interpretations than Hobbes or Locke would have wanted. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, argued that the only valid social contract would be one were individuals would be subject to laws that only themselves had made and assented to, as in a small direct democracy. Today the tradition of social contract reasoning is alive in the work of John Rawls and his intellectual heirs, though in a very abstract form. Rawls argued that rational individuals would only agree to social institutions specifying a set of inviolable basic liberties and a certain amount of redistribution to alleviate inequalities for the benefit of the worst off. Lockean state of nature reasoning, by contrast, is more common in the libertarian tradition of political thought represented by the work of Robert Nozick. Nozick argued that given the natural rights that human beings would have in a state of nature, the only state that could be justified would be a minimal state whose sole functions would be to provide protection and enforce agreements. Murray Rothbard, another prominent libertarian, suggests that these protection and enforcement functions of government lead to a definition of the state as any entity that has a monopoly on crime in a given area.

Some contemporary thinkers, such as Michel Foucault, have argued that political theory needs to get away from the notion of the state: "We need to cut off the king's head. In political theory that has still to be done."[21] By this he meant that power in the modern world is much more decentralized and uses different instruments than power in the early modern era, so that the notion of a sovereign, centralized state is increasingly out of date.

See also

Further reading

External links

References

  1. "sovereign", The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Houghton Mifflin Company), 2004, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sovereign, retrieved 21 February 2010, "adj. 1. Self-governing; independent: a sovereign state." 
    "sovereign", The New Oxford American Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ISBN 0-19-517077-6, "adjective ... [ attrib. ] (of a nation or state) fully independent and determining its own affairs: a sovereign, democratic republic." 
    Central Intelligence Agency, "Entities", The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#E, retrieved 23 February 2010, "'Independent state' refers to a people politically organized into a sovereign state with a definite territory." 
    See also, the decision of the British House of Lords in Duff Development Co. v. Kelantan Government [1924] 1 AC 797.
  2. See "Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy, Stephen D. Krasner, Princeton University Press, 1999, ISBN 069100711X
  3. 1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 66 (Sir Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1928)
  4. See Sovereignty in cases of Mandated Territories, in "International law and the protection of Namibia's territorial integrity", By S. Akweenda, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, ISBN 9041104127, page 40
  5. "Recognition", Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy.
  6. See B. Broms, "IV Recognition of States", pp 47-48 in International law: achievements and prospects, UNESCO Series, Mohammed Bedjaoui(ed), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, ISBN 9231027166 [1]
  7. See Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 1989, Yoram Dinstein, Mala Tabory eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990, ISBN 0-7923-0450-0, page 135-136 [2]
  8. Thomas D. Grant, The recognition of states: law and practice in debate and evolution (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), chapter 1.
  9. 9.0 9.1 Hillier, Tim (1998). Sourcebook on Public International Law. Routledge. pp. 201–2. ISBN 1859410502. http://books.google.com/books?id=Kr0sOuIx8q8C. 
  10. Kalevi Jaakko Holsti Taming the Sovereigns p. 128
  11. Lassa Oppenheim, Ronald Roxburgh (2005). International Law: A Treatise. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.. pp. 135. ISBN 1584776099, 9781584776093. http://books.google.com/books?id=vxJ1Jwmyw0EC&pg=PA135. 
  12. Grant, Thomas D. (1999). The recognition of states: law and practice in debate and evolution. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 1. ISBN 0275963500. http://books.google.com/books?id=GAQ8vIJE8_QC&lpg=PA1&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
  13. See for example, the oral arguments in the International Court of Justice case on Kosovo's declaration of independence. CR 2009/32, page 39 [3]
  14. Bilateral relations with countries, Retrieved 2009-12-22
  15. Arieff, Alexis (November 2008). "De facto Statehood? The Strange Case of Somaliland". Yale Journal of International Affairs. http://yalejournal.org/article/de-facto-statehood-strange-case-somaliland. Retrieved 2010-01-04. 
  16. "The List: Six Reasons You May Need A New Atlas Soon". Foreign Policy Magazine. July 2007. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3903. Retrieved 2010-01-04. 
  17. "Overview of De-facto States". Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. July 2008. http://www.unpo.org/content/view/8418/244/. Retrieved 2010-01-04. 
  18. Wiren, Robert (April 2008). "France recognizes de facto Somaliland". Les Nouvelles d'Addis Magazine. http://www.lesnouvelles.org/P10_magazine/15_grandentretien/15055_mahamudsalahnur_eng.html. Retrieved 2010-01-04. 
  19. Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan. Part I, chapter 13.
  20. Locke, John. 1689. Two Treatises of Government. Second Treatise, chapter 2.
  21. Foucault, Michel. 2000 [1976]. Truth and Power. In Power, edited by J. D. Fearon. New York: The New Press, p. 123. ISBN 1-56584-709-1